Hazard analysis

Hazard Analysis explained with simple examples

A hazard analysis is one of many methods that may be used to assess risk. At its core, the process entails describing a system object (such as a person or machine) that intends to conduct some activity. During the performance of that activity, an adverse event (referred to as a “factor”) may be encountered that could cause or contribute to an occurrence (mishap, incident, accident). Finally, that occurrence will result in some outcome that may be measured in terms of the degree of loss or harm. This outcome may be measured on a continuous scale, such as an amount of monetary loss, or the outcomes may be categorized into various levels of severity.

A Simple Hazard Analysis

If an automobile is an object performing an activity such as driving over a bridge, and that bridge may become icy, then an icy bridge might be identified as a hazard. If this hazard is encountered, it could cause or contribute to the occurrence of an automobile accident, and the outcome of that occurrence could range in severity from a minor fender-bender to a fatal accident.

Managing Risk through Hazard Analysis

A hazard analysis may be used to inform decisions regarding the mitigation of risk. For instance, the probability of encountering an icy bridge may be reduced by adding salt such that the ice will melt. Or, risk mitigation strategies may target the occurrence. For instance, putting tire chains on a vehicle does nothing to change the probability of a bridge becoming icy, but if an icy bridge is encountered, it does improve traction, reducing the chance of a sliding into another vehicle. Finally, risk may be managed by influencing the severity of outcomes. For instance, seatbelts and airbags do nothing to prevent bridges from becoming icy, nor do they prevent accidents caused by that ice. However, in the event of an accident, these devices lower the probability of the accident resulting in fatal or serious injuries.

Software Hazard Analysis

IEEE STD-1228-1994 Software Safety Plans prescribes industry best practices for conducting software safety hazard analyses to help ensure safety requirements and attributes are defined and specified for inclusion in software that commands, controls or monitors critical functions. When software is involved in a system, the development and design assurance of that software is often governed by DO-178C. The severity of consequence identified by the hazard analysis establishes the criticality level of the software. Software criticality levels range from A to E, corresponding to the severity of Catastrophic to No Safety Effect. Higher levels of rigor are required for level A and B software and corresponding functional tasks and work products is the system safety domain are used as objective evidence of meeting safety criteria and requirements.

In 2009[1] a leading edge commercial standard was promulgated based on decades of proven system safety processes in DoD and NASA. ANSI/GEIA-STD-0010-2009 (Standard Best Practices for System Safety Program Development and Execution) is a demilitarized commercial best practice that uses proven holistic, comprehensive and tailored approaches for hazard prevention, elimination and control. It is centered around the hazard analysis and functional based safety process.

Severity category examples

When used as part of an aviation hazard analysis, "Severity" describes the outcome (the degree of loss or harm) that results from an occurrence (an aircraft accident or incident). When categorized, severity categories must be mutually exclusive such that every occurrence has one, and only one, severity category associated with it. The definitions must also be collectively exhaustive such that all occurrences fall into one of the categories. In the US, the FAA includes five severity categories as part of its safety risk management policy. [2]

Severity Definition
Severity 1 - Catastrophic An expected unintentional effect that includes any of the following:
  • 3 or more fatalities
  • Manned aircraft hull loss with at least 1 fatality
Severity 2 - Hazardous An expected unintentional effect that includes any of the following:
  • 1-2 fatalities without manned aircraft hull loss
  • Manned aircraft hull loss without fatalities
  • 3 or more serious injuries
Severity 3 - Major An expected unintentional effect that includes any of the following:
  • 1-2 serious injuries
  • 3 or more minor injuries
  • Substantial damage to manned aircraft
  • Hull loss to unmanned aircraft > 55 lbs
Severity 4 - Minor An expected unintentional effect that includes any of the following:
  • 1-2 minor injuries
  • Minor damage to manned aircraft
  • Substantial damage to unmanned aircraft > 55 lbs
Severity 5 - Minimal Negligible safety effect


(medical devices)

Severity Definition
Catastrophic Results in death
Critical Results in permanent impairment or life-threatening injury
Serious Results in injury or impairment requiring professional medical intervention
Minor Results in temporary injury or impairment not requiring professional medical intervention
Negligible Results in temporary discomfort or inconvenience

Likelihood category examples

When used as part of an aviation hazard analysis, a "Likelihood" is a specific probability. It is the joint probabilty of a hazard occurring, that hazard causing or contributing to an aircraft accident or incident, and the resulting degree of loss or harm falling within one of the defined severity categories. Thus, if there are five severity categories, each hazard will have five likelihoods. In the US, the FAA provides a continuous probabilty scale for measuring likelihood, but also includes seven likelihood categories as part of its safety risk management policy. [2]

Likelihood Definition
Likelihood A - Frequent Probability < 1 but >= 1 × 10 5 {\displaystyle 1\times 10^{-5}}
Likelihood B - Infrequent Probability < 1 × 10 5 {\displaystyle 1\times 10^{-5}} but >= 1 × 10 6 {\displaystyle 1\times 10^{-6}}
Likelihood C - Extremely Infrequent Probability < 1 × 10 6 {\displaystyle 1\times 10^{-6}} but >= 1 × 10 7 {\displaystyle 1\times 10^{-7}}
Likelihood D - Remote Probability < 1 × 10 7 {\displaystyle 1\times 10^{-7}} but >= 1 × 10 8 {\displaystyle 1\times 10^{-8}}
Likelihood E - Extremetly Remote Probability < 1 × 10 8 {\displaystyle 1\times 10^{-8}} but >= 1 × 10 9 {\displaystyle 1\times 10^{-9}}
Likelihood F - Improbable Probability < 1 × 10 9 {\displaystyle 1\times 10^{-9}} but >= 1 × 10 10 {\displaystyle 1\times 10^{-10}}
Likelihood G - Extremely Improbable Probability < 1 × 10 10 {\displaystyle 1\times 10^{-10}} but > 0

(medical devices)

Likelihood Definition
Frequent ≥ 10−3
Probable < 10−3 and ≥ 10−4
Occasional < 10−4 and ≥ 10−5
Remote < 10−5 and ≥ 10−6
Improbable < 10−6

See also

  • Environmental hazard
  • Medical Device Risk Management - ISO 14971 – ISO standard
  • Failure mode and effects analysis – Analysis of potential system failures
  • Fault tree analysis – Failure analysis system used in safety engineering and reliability engineering
  • Hazard and operability study (HAZOP) – Study of risks in a plan or operation
  • Structured What If Technique (SWIFT) – Method of prospective hazards analysisPages displaying short descriptions of redirect targets
  • Layers of protection analysis (LOPA) – Technique for evaluating the hazards, risks and layers of protection of a system
  • Safety engineering – Engineering discipline which assures that engineered systems provide acceptable levels of safety
  • Reliability engineering – Sub-discipline of systems engineering that emphasizes dependability
  • Occupational safety and health – Field concerned with the safety, health and welfare of people at work
  • RTCA DO-178B – RTCA standard for safety-critical software (Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification)
  • RTCA DO-178C – International aeronautics software standard
  • RTCA DO-254 – Document for guidance of airborne electronic hardware (similar to DO-178B, but for hardware)
  • SAE ARP4761 – aerospace recommended practicePages displaying wikidata descriptions as a fallback (System safety assessment process)
  • SAE ARP4754 – Aerospace Practice (System development process)

Further reading

  • Center for Chemical Process Safety (1992). Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, with Worked Examples (2nd ed.). Wiley-American Institute Of Chemical Engineers. ISBN 0-8169-0491-X.
  • Bahr, Nicholas J. (1997). System Safety Engineering and Risk Assessment: A Practical Approach (Chemical Engineering) (1st ed.). Taylor & Francis Group. ISBN 1-56032-416-3.
  • Kletz, Trevor (1999). Hazop and Hazan (4th ed.). Taylor & Francis. ISBN 0-85295-421-2.

Notes

  1. ^ "Joint Software Systems Safety Engineering Handbook" (PDF). Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity. Retrieved 25 August 2021.
  2. ^ a b FAA 2023, p. C-2

References

FAA (September 29, 2023). "Safety Risk Management Policy (FAA Order 8040.4C)" (PDF). Retrieved May 6, 2024.

External links

  • CFR, Title 29-Labor, Part 1910--Occupational Safety and Health Standards, § 1910.119
    U.S. OSHA regulations regarding "Process safety management of highly hazardous chemicals" (especially Appendix C).
  • FAA Order 8040.4 establishes FAA safety risk management policy.
  • The FAA publishes a System Safety Handbook that provides a good overview of the system safety process used by the agency.
  • IEEE 1584-2002 Standard which provides guidelines for doing arc flash hazard assessment.
  • v
  • t
  • e
Occupational
diseases
and injuriesOccupational
hygieneProfessionsAgencies and
organizations
International
National
StandardsSafetyLegislationSee also
  • Category
    • Occupational diseases
    • Journals
    • Organizations
  • Commons
  • Glossary
  • v
  • t
  • e
Basic equipment
Breathing gas
Buoyancy and
trim equipment
Decompression
equipment
Diving suit
Helmets
and masks
Instrumentation
Mobility
equipment
Safety
equipment
Underwater
breathing
apparatus
Open-circuit
scuba
Diving rebreathers
Surface-supplied
diving equipment
Diving
equipment
manufacturers
Access equipment
Breathing gas
handling
Decompression
equipment
Platforms
Underwater
habitat
Remotely operated
underwater vehicles
Safety equipment
General
Activities
Competitions
Equipment
Freedivers
Hazards
Historical
Organisations
Occupations
Military
diving
Military
diving
units
Underwater
work
Salvage diving
  • SS Egypt
  • Kronan
  • La Belle
  • SS Laurentic
  • RMS Lusitania
  • Mars
  • Mary Rose
  • USS Monitor
  • HMS Royal George
  • Vasa
Diving
contractors
Tools and
equipment
Underwater
weapons
Underwater
firearm
Specialties
Diver
organisations
Diving tourism
industry
Diving events
and festivals
Diving
hazards
Consequences
Diving
procedures
Risk
management
Diving team
Equipment
safety
Occupational
safety and
health
Diving
disorders
Pressure
related
Oxygen
Inert gases
Carbon dioxide
Breathing gas
contaminants
Immersion
related
Treatment
Personnel
Screening
Research
Researchers in
diving physiology
and medicine
Diving medical
research
organisations
Law
Archeological
sites
Underwater art
and artists
Engineers
and inventors
Historical
equipment
Diver
propulsion
vehicles
Military and
covert operations
  • Raid on Alexandria (1941)
  • Sinking of the Rainbow Warrior
Scientific projects
Awards and events
Incidents
Dive boat incidents
  • Sinking of MV Conception
Diver rescues
Early diving
Freediving fatalities
Offshore
diving incidents
  • Byford Dolphin diving bell accident
  • Drill Master diving accident
  • Star Canopus diving accident
  • Stena Seaspread diving accident
  • Venture One diving accident
  • Waage Drill II diving accident
  • Wildrake diving accident
Professional
diving fatalities
Scuba diving
fatalities
Publications
Manuals
  • NOAA Diving Manual
  • U.S. Navy Diving Manual
  • Basic Cave Diving: A Blueprint for Survival
  • Underwater Handbook
  • Bennett and Elliott's physiology and medicine of diving
  • Encyclopedia of Recreational Diving
  • The new science of skin and scuba diving
  • Professional Diver's Handbook
  • Basic Scuba
Standards and
Codes of Practice
General non-fiction
Research
Dive guides
Training and registration
Diver
training
Skills
Recreational
scuba
certification
levels
Core diving skills
Leadership skills
Specialist skills
Diver training
certification
and registration
organisations
Commercial diver
certification
authorities
Commercial diving
schools
Free-diving
certification
agencies
Recreational
scuba
certification
agencies
Scientific diver
certification
authorities
Technical diver
certification
agencies
Cave
diving
Military diver
training centres
Military diver
training courses
Surface snorkeling
Snorkeling/breath-hold
Breath-hold
Open Circuit Scuba
Rebreather
  • Underwater photography
Sports governing
organisations
and federations
Competitions
Pioneers
of diving
Underwater
scientists
archaeologists and
environmentalists
Scuba record
holders
Underwater
filmmakers
and presenters
Underwater
photographers
Underwater
explorers
Aquanauts
Writers and journalists
Rescuers
Frogmen
Commercial salvors
Diving
physics
Diving
physiology
Decompression
theory
Diving
environment
Classification
Impact
Other
Deep-submergence
vehicle
  • Aluminaut
  • DSV Alvin
  • American submarine NR-1
  • Bathyscaphe
    • Archimède
    • FNRS-2
    • FNRS-3
    • Harmony class bathyscaphe
    • Sea Pole-class bathyscaphe
    • Trieste II
  • Deepsea Challenger
  • Ictineu 3
  • JAGO
  • Jiaolong
  • Konsul-class submersible
  • Limiting Factor
  • Russian submarine Losharik
  • Mir
  • Nautile
  • Pisces-class deep submergence vehicle
  • DSV Sea Cliff
  • DSV Shinkai
  • DSV Shinkai 2000
  • DSV Shinkai 6500
  • DSV Turtle
  • DSV-5 Nemo
Submarine rescue
Deep-submergence
rescue vehicle
Submarine escape
Escape set
Special
interest
groups
Neutral buoyancy
facilities for
Astronaut training
Other